PROSPECTS AND LIMITS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF UNRECOGNIZED STATES: BETWEEN ORGANIZED HYPOCRACY AND PRIVATE INTERESTS by Riegl, Martin
European Scientific Journal   February 2014  edition vol.10, No.4  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
17 
PROSPECTS AND LIMITS OF ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT OF UNRECOGNIZED STATES: 
BETWEEN ORGANIZED HYPOCRACY AND 
PRIVATE INTERESTS1 
 
 
 
Mgr. Martin Riegl, PhD 
Department of Political Science, Institute of Political Studies,  
Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague 
 
 
Abstract 
Following text deals with prospects and limits of economic growth of 
contemporary unrecognized states, which represent a group of specific 
political-geographic entities within the post-1945 political space. The aim of 
the contribution is to analyse the impact of non-recognition on potential and 
restrains of unrecognized states. Despite of the generally accepted 
conventional wisdom, I do argue that unrecognized states are prevalently 
heterogeneous entities, not only considering their internal effectiveness but 
also their position within the world order. It is also reflected in their ability to 
reach political (recognition) as well as economic goals (prosperity). I do base 
my approach on questioning the argument that unrecognized states constitute 
effective entities which do lack international recognition only. I argue that 
geopolitical situation and economic performance of unrecognized states is 
mainly determined by their geographical location outside of the global gap. 
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Introduction 
I proceed from a multidisciplinary and diachronic approach based 
upon an empirical analysis of the 1946-2013 political space. I delineate all 
unilateral attempts at secession, which have led to de facto independence (i.e. 
to the emergence of a political-geographic entity capable of questioning the 
authority of a central government, within the jurisdiction of which that 
                                                          
1 The text is an outcome of Project Prvouk no. 17 –Studying Societal, Political and Media 
Challenges in the Contemporary World, Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Social 
Sciences, Institute of Political Studies. 
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entity’s territory formally fell). Theoretically the text is framed within the 
neorealist approach stressing the continuing importance of physical division 
of space, anarchic environment as well as the New Middle Age Theory, 
which is able to explain the existence of anomalous political entities as the 
result of a decline of the sovereign state based system (particularly regions) 
and rising disorder and insecurity in world affairs. H. Bull does not consider 
globalization as a source of relevant changes in the international system. 
(Bottici 2002). I base my research on “Waltz´s argument that globalization is 
not global but is mainly limited to northern latitudes” (Waltz 1999) and 
Barnett´s dichotomy of Functioning Core and Non-Integrating Gap which 
has been shrinking as globalization has expanded (Barnett 2005) and where 
the majority of unrecognized states is located. It can be assumed that 
unrecognized states are trapped in the anarchic world of positive sovereignty 
outside the globalized post-modern world. 
This text is based on the following hypotheses: 1) international 
recognition is the core definition characteristic of a state and impacts 
political status as well as economic prosperity, 2) unrecognized states are 
highly heterogeneous group of political and geographic entities, 
3) geopolitical situation and economic performance is mainly determined by 
geographical location of unrecognized states. All above mentioned factors 
have impact on the international position and economic prosperity of 
particular unrecognized state. Unrecognized states pursue political 
(independence) as well as economic goals (prosperity) which are not 
unrelated. I will prove my hypotheses through a definition of unrecognized 
state, and empirical-analytical research of the political space between 1946 – 
2013 with a particular focus on existing unrecognized. Some authors have 
already pointed out to the fact that there are numerous problems in 
terminology, so this aspect can not be ignored. I do analyze a comprehensive 
list of terms for entities derogating from the sovereign state. In order to 
analyze prospects and limits of economic growth of contemporary 
unrecognized states, we have to analyze a character and importance of 
international recognition as well as to consider a geopolitical position of 
unrecognized states (e. g. geographical location, different interests of global 
and regional powers, a state affected by the secession of particular 
unrecognized state, potential external patron of the unrecognized states, 
regional or sub-regional institutions) and political geography of such an 
unrecognized state. It is just a combination of internal and external factors 
that shapes the international environment and dictates prospects and limits of 
economic growths which all unrecognized entities depend on.  
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Definition of the unrecognized state 
I proceed from the definition of internationally unrecognized entities 
seeking to gain a full-fledged sovereign-state status but lacking significant 
international recognition. Such entities must demonstrate internal 
effectiveness (usually heterogeneous in time and space), which would enable 
them to control population and territory (and thus economic activity) within 
the territory to which they lay claim.  
Delineation of the period during which an entity must meet given 
characteristics (effectively control internal affairs) is a methodologically 
onerous task. P. Kolsto and N. Caspersen suggest a two-year period but 
justification of their argument in a methodological way would be quite a 
controversial assignment. I consider precise delineation of the time period of 
de facto independent existence as a superfluous definitional characteristic and 
believe it could create methodological mishaps. Therefore I am inclined to 
believe that the duration of de facto independent existence should be 
considered for the various entities. Some entities continue to meet such 
characteristics for a period of more than 20 years (e. g. Tamil Eelam, 
Somaliland or Northern Cyprus), but others will cease to exist within a few 
months of declaring independence (usually after military intervention by the 
central government and failure to establish effective control over the territory 
(e. g. Anjouan). Besides the delineation of the time period N. Caspersen tried 
to precisely define the condition of effective control over the territory to 
which they lay claim. “An unrecognized state has achieved de facto 
independence, covering at least two-thirds of the territory to which it claims 
and including main city and key regions.” (Caspersen 2012: 11). Such 
delineation is also superfluous definitional criterion, the unrecognized state 
meeting the criteria of internal effectiveness should be able to control the 
territory to which it lay claim. It is important to note that unrecognized states 
constitute a whole spectrum of entities stretching from stable to collapsed 
states. 
 
Terminology 
The phenomenon of internationally unrecognized entities is 
characterized by methodological confusion. Authors label these entities as de 
facto state (Pegg 1998), self-proclaimed state, unrecognized state (Chirikba 
2004), pseudo-state (Kolossov; O´Loughlin 1998), outcast countries, pariah-
state (Payne; Veney 2001: 438), anti-state, insurgent state (Muir 1997: 175), 
J. A. Frowein introduced the term de facto regime (Scheu 2008: 5), para-
state, almost-state (Stanislawski 2008, Pelczynska-Nalecz; Strachota and 
Falkowski 2008), proto-state, nascent-state (Smid; Vadura 2009: 47), 
separatist state, self-proclaimed states (Chirikba 2004), de facto quasi-states 
(Rywkin 2006), and quasi-state (Baev 1998, Chirikba 2004, Rywkin 2006, 
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Kolsto 2006, Stanislawski 2008, Riegl 2010). Particular terms describe 
subjects which are virtually independent on the central government of the 
parent state, but differ in internal characteristics. All these entities lack the 
international recognition, although de facto entities not seeking international 
recognition may be identified. Terminology describes them as insurgent state 
(McColl 1969), anti-state (MUIR), black spot, state-within state 
(Stanislawski 2008, Pelczynska-Nalecz; Strachota and Falkowski 2008). 
While terms insurgent state, black spot anti-state describe self-governing 
entities under the administration of rebel groups seeking to overthrow the 
central government, the term state-within state describes de facto 
independent region which is out of the control of the central government as a 
result of the state break-down, but does not challenge the central 
government's legitimacy.  
While unrecognized states and failed states are often seen as 
opposites (in terms of internal sovereignty), we can identify terminological 
notions challenging this paradigm. An important term failed almost state 
merged in this respect (Pelczynska-Nalecz et al. 2008), which points at the 
fact that many unrecognized states suffer from attributes of state failure. This 
fact has an enormous impact on their prospects and limits of economic 
growth.  
Definition and Importance of International Recognition 
Prior to decolonization, political map was a patchwork of overlapping 
sovereignties (empires, sovereign states, colonies, protectorates), but today it 
pretends to be a colourful patchwork consisting of sovereign territorial states 
only (with the exception of self and non-self governing territories). In other 
words: „The international game is now closer to zero-sum game, there are 
states and there is little else.” (Lynch 2004: 18). But only formally. At the 
second glance it is obvious there is another map behind the political map of 
the world (reflecting existing reality) which demonstrates the existence of 
various anomalous political entities. International recognition is at present 
not only an oft discussed definition characteristic of a state but at the same 
time it has been emerging with growing intensity as an important 
geopolitical instrument of pursuing the foreign policy interests of global and 
regional powers (Russia´s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia may be 
mentioned among other examples).  
Experts in international law, international relations and political 
sciences will not agree on the merit and significance of international 
recognition. While the dispute between the proponents of declaratory and 
constitutive theories of international recognition remains unresolved, I argue 
that due to changes of regulatory rules of recognition and the introduction of 
a negative sovereignty, the development of political space after 1945 seems 
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to bear a constitutive character. International recognition2 is one of the most 
important yet controversial characteristics of a sovereign state. In this 
context, S. D. Krasner speaks about sovereignty under international law, 
without which effective territory control is actually insufficient.3 Jackson and 
Rosberg documented the key role of international recognition on the 
empirical examples of South African Bantustans (Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, 
Transkei and Venda), which meet the empirical prerequisites of statehood 
but, as they were not recognized by any other state except for the Republic of 
South Africa, they cannot be considered states.4 Lack of international 
recognition had historically a decisive impact on the existence of some of 
unrecognized states – Biafra, Cabinda, South Kasai, Tanna among others. 
Leading proponent of political geography M. I. Glassner’s definition of 
sovereign state emphasizes the relationship between geographic and political 
criteria of statehood. Chief among them, according to Glassner, are: 
1) Sovereignty5, 
2)   Recognition. For a political unit to be accepted as a state, it must 
be recognized by a significant part of the international community, i.e. 
existing states.  
How large should that part be and how should it be structured – does 
it need to include regional and global powers or permanent UN SC members, 
or even parent states in case of unrecognized states? The question remains 
unanswered. The issue gained prominence in the wake of Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence and a successful referendum on independence 
for South Sudan (the former is the case of unilateral secession without the 
consent of the parent state). However an economic viability of both entities 
is heavily influenced by relations with former parent states which are capable 
of blocking their economic activities (oil export in the case of South Sudan). 
The essence of international recognition is for a state to receive international 
legitimacy (and thus also the access to international organizations, markets 
etc.) and to become subject to the regulatory rules of sovereignty (i.e. other 
states respect its territorial integrity and the principle of non-intervention).  
The absence of international recognition means that unrecognized 
entity is perceived as illegitimate in the eyes of international community. 
                                                          
2 In this text I use both the term international recognition and the term external sovereignty – 
the latter meaning the state has been internationally recognized by a significant part of the 
international community and thus becomes a fully-fledged member of that community, with 
all rights and duties. 
3 Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocracy. 
4 Jackson and Rosberg, “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical 
in Statehood.”, 13-4. 
5 Thus, a leading international-law authority on the issue of state, R. Crawford replaces the 
term sovereignty with the term independence of the state. 
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Such entities are not protected by the system of negative sovereignty and 
face traditional security dilemma in anarchic international environment. 
According to N. Caspersen: “The security concerns associated with 
unrecognized states fall in two broad camps: (1) risks associated with porous 
borders and unregulated territories, and (2) the risk of renewed warfare over 
the contested territory.” (Caspersen 2012: 45). Thus permanent external 
threat of renewed warfare and pariah status strengthens the internal cohesion 
lack of international legitimacy justifies high expenditures on security forces 
and state institutions. Lack of international recognition and international 
isolation prevents unrecognized states from joining the ranks of sovereign 
states, described by R. H. Jackson as the world’s most exclusive political 
club. And thus cannot enjoy all benefits of political and economic 
globalization. Thus significance of international recognition primarily lies in 
its impact on entity´s international position which causes its internal 
difficulties and external threats. It is safe to say that international recognition 
is the centre point of its existence. Unrecognized states find themselves in 
anarchic world where independence is more important than economy. 
Geopolitical position of unrecognized states in post-1945 era 
From a historical perspective, three different historical-political 
situations, which lead to the unilateral declaration of the entity, may be 
defined. They are the following types of secession: 
1) in compliance with the right to self-determination (entities which 
declared independence during the decolonization process),  
2) in conflict with the right to self-determination (entities forming on a 
dependent territory which did not undergo the decolonization process 
and whose emergence was in conflict with the principle of a nation’s 
right to self-determination),  
3) outside the context of decolonization (a fairly large group of entities 
emerging after formal decolonization of dependent territories and the 
establishment of internationally recognized sovereign states, on whose 
territories there were post-independence attempts to unilaterally 
declare independence for parts of such territories). 
It is not possible to generally assume that all that matters are the 
historical and the geopolitical circumstances, which determine the outcome 
of an effort to gain independence, because also internal political processes 
matter. “In most cases ethno-nationalism provided an important driving 
force, state break-down was often an important factor, and external 
assistance was crucial.” (Caspersen 2012: 26-27). Brief empirical analyses of 
1946 - 2013 period will produce the following list of unrecognized entities 
seeking the status of the full-fledged sovereign state. A certain period of time 
must elapse from a declaration of independence to a broad international 
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recognition, during which a new entity receives formal recognition and is co-
opted by the international community (endorsement of UN admission). In 
this period it is not possible to refer to internationally unrecognized entities 
as unrecognized states unless the process of achieving international 
recognition is put in doubt.  
Table 1-1: List of Unrecognized States in 1946-2009 
 Origin/ 
existence 
Unrecognized existence 
Between 1946–2010 
Factors limiting sovereign state 
status 
Abkhazia, 
Republic of 
3.7.1992 1992– Recognized by Russian Federation, 
Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru. 
Actually a puppet entity of Russian 
Federation. 
Anjouan, State of 
 
3.8.1997 1997–2002 
2007–2008 
No international recognition, 
limited internal sovereignty. 
Biafra, Republic 
of 
30.5.1967 1967–1970 Biafra recognized by five states. 
Bophuthatswana 6.12.1977 1977–1994 No international recognition, 
actually no internal sovereignty (de 
facto under RSA control). 
Cabinda, 
Republic 
1.8.1975 1975–11. 11. 1975 No international recognition. 
Chechen Republic 
of Ichkeria 
9.10.1991 1991–1999 
 
No international recognition. 16 
years after USSR collapse, this 
small territory housed three types of 
para-states including almost-state, 
black spot and state within state. 
China, Republic 
of (Taiwan) 
7.10.1949 1971– Sovereign state until 1971. State 
with limited international 
recognition since 1971. Officially 
claims control of mainland China. 
Currently recognized by 23 
sovereign states, military 
guarantees by the USA. 
Ciskei 
 
1981 1981–1994 No international recognition (de 
facto under RSA control). 
Croat Republic of 
Herzeg-Bosnia 
18.11.1991 1992–1996 No international recognition. 
East Mongolian 
Republic 
15.1.1946–
1.5.1947 
1946–1947 No international recognition. 
East Timor, 
Democratic 
Republic of 
28.11. 
1975–
17.7.1976, 
20.5. 2002 
1975–1976 
 
 
Internationally unrecognized quasi-
state (according to some sources 
recognized by Albania, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde Islands, 
Mozambique, St. Thomas and 
Principe Islands) – unrecognized 
strong institutions eliminated by 
military intervention by Indonesian 
central government. 
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East Turkestan, 
Republic of 
12.11. 
1944–17. 
12.1949 
1946–1949 No international recognition. 
Eritrea, State 27.5.1993 1961–1993 No international recognition. 
Gagauzia  1991-1994 No international recognition. 
Hyderabad 1724–1950 1947–1950 No international recognition. 
Kachin State 1962 1962–1994 No international recognition. 
Karen State 
(Cotulay) 
1952–1994 1952–1994 
 
No international recognition. 
Katanga, State 11.7.1960 1960–15.1.1963 No international recognition. 
Kosovo, Republic 9.10.1991–
May 1992, 
2008– 
 
1991–1992 
 
 
2008– 
Internationally unrecognized quasi-
state, recognised only by Albania. 
In 1992 Serbia occupied and 
pacified the province 
Limited international recognition. 
Moheli 11.8.1997 1997–1998 No international recognition. 
Nagorno-
Karabakh, 
Republic of 
6.1.1992 1992– No international recognition. 
Palestinian state 15.11.1988 1988–2009 Limited international recognition. 
Republic of 
Kurdistan 
(Mahabad) 
22.1.1946 1946–1947 
 
No international recognition. 
Republic of North 
Salomon Islands - 
Bougainville 
1.9.1975 
 
1975–1997 
 
No international recognition. 
Republika Srpska 
(in Bosnia-
Hercegovina) 
9. 1. 1992 1991–1995 No international recognition. 
Rhodesia 11.11.1965 1965–1979 Internationally unrecognized, 
internally non-sovereign quasi-state 
in 1965-1975 1965–1975. 
Rhodesia-
Zimbabwe 
1.6.1979 1979 No international recognition. 
Sahrawi Arab 
Democratic 
Republic 
14.11.1975 
 
1976– Partial international recognition. 
Serbian Krajina, 
Republic of 
19.12.1991 1991–1995 No international recognition, de 
facto dependent on Serbia. 
Sikkim 1890–1975 1946–1949 
1949–1975 
No international recognition. Quasi-
protectorate of Great Britain and 
India. 
Somaliland, 
Republic of 
18.5.1991 1991–2009 
 
No international recognition. 
South Kasai 8.8.1960 1960–1962 No international recognition. 
South Ossetia, 
Republic of 
28.11.1991 1992–2009 
 
No international recognition 
(recognized since 2008 by Russian 
Federation, Nicaragua, Venezuela 
and Nauru), controls ca. 80-85% of 
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claimed territory, in reality a puppet 
quasi-state controlled by Russian 
Federation. 
Suvadives, United 
Republic 
3.1.1959 1959–1963 No international recognition. 
Tamil Eelam  1986–2009 No international recognition. 
Tanna (Tafea) 
 
24.3.1974–
29.6.1974 
15.2.1980– 
26.5.1980 
1974, 1980 No international recognition. 
Tibet 
 
(1.3.1913) 
4. 11.1949–
23.5.1951 
1946–1951 No international recognition. 
Trans-Dniester 
Moldavian 
Republic 
2.9.1990 1990– No international recognition, 
actually a puppet quasi-state of 
Russian Federation. 
Transkei 26.10.1976 
 
 
1976–1994 No international recognition, de 
facto no internal sovereignty 
(actually controlled by RSA). 
Turkish Republic 
of Northern 
Cyprus 
1983 1983– Internationally recognized by 
Turkey (de facto guarantor of 
existence). 
Venda 13.9.1979 1979–1994 No international recognition, de facto 
no internal sovereignty (actually 
controlled by RSA). 
Western Bosnia 27.9.1993 1993–1995 No international recognition. 
 
Distinct majority of unrecognized states which emerged in the post-
1945 period either gained independence, e. g. Eritrea or have been eliminated 
by their parent state, e.g. South Kasai, Katanga or Biafra. It is important to 
note, as observed by N. Caspersen that a majority of unrecognized states is 
located in highly volatile regions, and are themselves the product of violent 
conflict. Unrecognized states are often born out of state collapse or extreme 
state weakness and represent areas of state failure in the sense that the central 
state has lost control over the territory. An analysis of the 1946 - 2013 
political space reveals the fact that all existing unrecognized states (except of 
Taiwan) are located within the global gap, not a core. Moreover 
unrecognized entities result from armed conflicts. Being located within the 
global gap and highly volatile regions is not a favourable geographical 
location or geopolitical situation for the state-building and nation-building 
process. Unrecognized entities are trapped in insecure environment, facing 
external pressure from their parent states as well as international community. 
Such environment forces them to justify their existence internally as well as 
externally. Having spoken about historical examples of unrecognized states it 
is important to be aware of the fact that economy or even private interests 
was a driving force behind the attempted unilateral secession. Typical 
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examples are Katanga, Biafra, Cabinda, South Kasai, Vemerama6, 
Pridnestrovia (mainly serves interests of ruling elite and Sheriff company) 
and many others. Generally political elites of all unrecognized states derive 
their demands for international recognition from: 
1) alleged internal effectiveness (capability to control territory and 
population within the claimed jurisdiction),  
2) territorial and governmental legitimacy (expressed by democratic 
political systems and instruments of direct democracy), 
3) historical tradition of statehood, 
4) right to self-determination. 
Unrecognized states are often characterized as the opposite to failed 
or collapsed states, which became kind of widely accepted conventional 
wisdom. D. Lynch pointed at their deemed effectiveness in internal affairs. 
“First, these authorities explicitly adhere to an empirical definition of 
statehood and sovereignty along the lines of the 1933 Montevideo 
Convention. They maintain that they fulfil all the conditions of positive 
sovereignty.” (LYNCH 2004: 43). With a deeper knowledge of situation 
within particular entities, such statements become apparently at least 
controversial. It might be even argued that the opposite is true. Generally 
unrecognized and failed or collapsed states are not unrelated and might be 
even perceived as two sides of the coin. “The two types of entities are not 
unrelated in that they often result from similar conflicts and wars, but 
although they have certain similarities, it is important to distinguish between 
the two concepts, which in some way are polar opposites.” (Caspersen 2012: 
7). Especially those which emerged in the post-Cold War era, South Ossetia, 
Abhkazia, Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh among others. 
Another argument used by unrecognized states´ political elites in 
their claims to international recognition is alleged democratic nature: 
“Rhetorical commitment to democracy is found in a majority of the cases, 
but popular legitimacy has traditionally been demonstrated through 
independence referenda, other than through actual democratic 
elections…“they are also claiming to be more democratic than their parent 
states and they frequently describe themselves as islands of democracy in 
otherwise authoritarian waters.” (Caspersen 2012: 85, 71).  Democracy is 
widely considered the only legitimate form of the government so they often 
use the instruments of direct democracy to demonstrate popular support and 
justify demands for independent statehood. All the unrecognized states base 
their claims to independence on popular elections or referenda and legislative 
                                                          
6 Another example is the state of Vemerana (moreless private business project), which Prime 
Minister Jimmy Stevens declared independence in July 1980 and refused for Vemerana to 
become part of the independent state of Vanuatu. His state came to the end after a Papua-
New Guinea military intervention in the August of the same year. 
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effects to this effect (Lynch 2004: 48). “In many cases referenda conducted 
in territories willing to secede have returned very substantial majorities in 
favour (in the range of 65-99%).” (Crawford 2006: 417). Voters in 
contemporary unrecognized states voted in favour of independence (in the 
range of 70,2 - 99,8%, turnout 72 - 97%). However this does not mean that 
secessionist entities are more democratic than parent states. Democratic 
procedure barely meets standards of free and fair elections, e.g. elections are 
conducted without the presence of independent electoral observers (however 
elections in Somaliland are monitored by International Republican Institute). 
Available data (from Freedom House) offer clear picture: average rate of 
civil liberties and political rights among nine existing unrecognized states 
(data for Palestine are not available) is 4,4 and 4,5 respectively, meaning that 
average unrecognized state would be labelled as not free. Exceptions are 
Taiwan and Northern Cyprus which are classified as free. We will find 
average rate of civil liberties 3,8 and 3,6 for political rights respectively 
among parent states. Obviously unrecognized states are not more democratic 
than parent states they are seeking to secede from. They range from free 
states (Taiwan and TRNC) to partly-free (Somaliland) and not-free (South 
Ossetia or SADR). 
D. Lynch mentions additional arguments used by unrecognized 
states´ elites: “There are two further claimed sources of legitimacy: one 
historical, the other moral.” (Lynch 2004: 49). It means tradition of statehood 
and right to self-determination. However both are irrelevant with respect to 
the fact that all existing unrecognized states emerged outside the context of 
decolonization where the principle of self-determination cannot be applied. 
From the geopolitical perspective the position of unrecognized states ranges 
from wide recognition (Kosovo, Palestine), over engagement (Taiwan, 
Somaliland) to outcast status (Rhodesia, Republika Srpska Krajina). This 
leads unrecognized states to pursue their own strategies in order to secure 
their vital interests, independent statehood respectively. Although the system 
based on the institution of sovereign state is according to numerous authors 
declining. Not being able to gain international recognition, particular entities 
either rely on their own resources (e. g. Somaliland) or an external patron 
state (e. g. South Ossetia). The first strategy is prospective in case of 
strategically situated entities. Somaliland´s strategic position on the Horn of 
Africa, by fear of instability, and by the lack of effective opposition from 
Somaliland´s parent state, Somalia. “Somaliland´s independence is supported 
by Rwanda, South Africa, and Zambia.” (Caspersen 2012: 43). Somaliland´s 
situation is eased by the breakdown of state institutions in Somalia, which is 
the decisive factor enabling Somaliland to survive. On the other side all 
Euroasia´s unrecognized (also TRNC and Taiwan respectively) states rely on 
patron state which provides security guarantees and economic support. N. 
European Scientific Journal   February 2014  edition vol.10, No.4  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
28 
Caspersen argues that: „Reliance on a patron state is also not free of cost, 
and the patron-client relationship is therefore marked by tension, even in 
cases where this dependence is largely desired – and not imposed.” 
(Caspersen 2012: 109). Unrecognized states are still trapped in geopolitically 
hostile environment characterized by external threats which does not allow 
them to enjoy benefits of: 
 political globalization (recognition, embassies, membership in 
international organizations, international agreements, participation in 
UN peace-keeping operations etc.), 
 economic globalization (export, import, foreign investments, 
development aid etc.) 
 in order to reduce security risks and importance of military power.  
 
The economic impact of non-recognition on unrecognized states in the 
era of globalization 
The post-Cold War era, however, appeals to existing unrecognized 
states with different constraints and different possibilities. It is safe to argue 
that the existence of unrecognized states negatively impacts economies of 
parent states and thus vital interest of parent state is to restore its territorial 
integrity (core attribute of statehood) through all available means. This 
inevitably impacts unrecognized states´ very existence. They find themselves 
located in the global gap, volatile regions and generally vulnerable in a 
hostile environment, which diminishes their chance for successful state-
building and long-term survival. Position of parent states and international 
community (position of parent state and international recognition may 
completely differ if the secession is perceived as the result of wild-scale 
breach of human rights) to unrecognized states ranges from 1) elimination 
(Republika Srpska Krajina, Bougainville), 2) active opposition (Rhodesia), 
3) ignorance (Somaliland), 4) limited acceptance (Northern Cyprus7 and 
Taiwan widely), 5) recognition (Palestine, SADR). The Bouganiville 
managed to resist the pressure from the parent state and survive against the 
wishes of certain governments (e. g. Australia) and subsequently negotiate a 
peace agreement that promises independence referendum between 2015 - 
2020.8 It must be noted that Bougainville faced extremely unfavourable 
conditions without any external support.  
                                                          
7 “After the Annan Plan for Cyprus was defeated by the Greek Cypriot population in 2004, 
international engagement with Northern Cyprus has increased and some observers now 
speak of the risk of Taiwanization….(CASPERSEN 2012: 115).” 
8 „One of the most extreme examples of this kind of strategy was the brutal eight-year-long 
air and sea blockade the Papua New Guinea government imposed on Bougainville. All 
transport was halted including medical supplies and humanitarian aid, resulting in great 
hardship for the Bougainvillean population (CASPERSEN 2012: 130).“ 
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In completely different situation is Taiwan, a unrecognized state of 
sui generis which has unlimited access to international markets and profit 
from high engagement with the parent state is obvious.9 “Taiwan does 30 
percent of its trade with China, with 40 percent its export going to 
mainland.” (Kaplan 2013: 218). 
Specific position of Taiwan may also be documented by economic 
data. Its GDP slightly exceeds 20 000 USD per capita. However most of 
unrecognized states lie between the extreme cases of Taiwan and 
Bougainville. They find themselves in a position of pariah country which 
restrains their economic performance. Unrecognized states are unable to 
attract foreign investors, join international organization (such as Universal 
postal union, World Trade Organization), trade on the global market (in the 
field of commodities, military equipment etc.), obtain loans from 
International Monetary Fund or World Bank, their citizens are restricted in 
travelling or representing their „states“ in sport. In long-term run it leads to 
frustration among population and depopulation, brain-drain and loss of 
human capital. All above mentioned factors strongly restrain economic 
performance of all those entities. Vulnerability of unrecognized states arises 
not only from their pariah status in international community, but also from 
resources they are endowed with. The territory of existing unrecognized 
states ranges from 0,37% in case of Taiwan to 37% in case of SADR of the 
parent state´s territory. If we consider a share of population, unrecognized 
states constitute obvious majority, the most significant in this respect is 
Somaliland, Palestine, TRNC and Kosovo. Combination of external threat, 
outcast position and limited resources does not necessary lead to erosion of 
governmental legitimacy (popular support), but it inevitably increases 
pressure on the unrecognized state budgets which are forced to maintain 
military expenditures as a top priority. Subsequently other aspect of state-
building are underfinanced (infrastructure, state institutions, public 
services…). “Reliance on self-generated economic growth is not a viable 
strategy so unrecognized states without access to international markets are 
forced to find alternative sources of financing, which is a patron state10 or 
                                                          
9 „The most extensive degree of engagement with the parent state is propably seen in 
Taiwan….After an absence of nearly sixty years, direct flights between China and Taiwan 
were introduced in 2008, resulting in an increase in tourist revenue for the island 
(CASPERSEN 2012: 66).“ 
10 “Armenia, for example, serves as a vital economic lifeline for Nagorno Karabach, 
Karabach uses the Armenian currency, its inhabitants use Armianian passports, and Armenia 
grants the entity a so-called interstate loan, which in the first years after the war made up the 
vast majority of Karabakh´s budget. Armenia, moreover, provides the main market for 
products from Nagorno Karabach and contitutes its only link with the outsider world. In 
fact, hen it comes to economy, culture, and defence, Nagorno Karabach and Armenia can be 
seen as a single space. Similarly, Russia has since 2002 provided the inhabitants of 
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diaspora community´s financial and economic support. However, (t)he main 
tendency is probably closer to a case such as Somaliland, whose GDP per 
capita was estimated at only 226 USD in 2003. As a comparison, South 
Ossetia´s GDP per capita was in 2002 estimated at 250 USD and Abkhazia´s 
was in 2001 estimated at 350 USD. The Abkhaz authorities argue that by 
2009, it had increased to 2530 USD.” (Caspersen 2012: 54). Lack of 
recognition results in flourishing shadow economies (it is often reaction to 
trade blockades imposed by parent state as in case of Bougainville).11 The 
most extreme case is Transnistria where the gap between „state“ and 
Sheriff´s company private interest was virtually closed. “On the other side in 
the context of non-recognition it is often difficult to distinguish illegal trade 
driven by criminal element from illegal trade driven by the need for 
survival.” (Caspersen 2012: 22). While emergence of the unrecognized state 
is determined by internal factors, its result is defined by external factors. The 
unrecognized state can survive without significant recognition and 
economically prosper in the era of globalization. The most obvious example 
is Taiwan, Somaliland, TRNC or Bougainville. Prospects and restrains of 
economic performance depend on interests and approach of the parent state, 
patron state and international community. „The economic tool has also been 
praised as potentially positive by the international community, which hopes 
that unrecognized states will be encouraged to compromise by the promise of 
eventual assistance for reconstruction and reform.” (Lynch 2004: 63). 
Overall performance is, however, affected by their position on the 
world political map. With the exception of Taiwan all unrecognized states 
are located outside the integrating, rich and prosperous global core which 
determines their economic performance. It is obvious that systemic forces of 
political, military power, economic forces of globalization and international 
rules contributes to emergence of entities with qualitatively different level of 
statehood. Cooper or Sorensen speak about pre-modern, modern and post-
modern (post-colonial) state. Each category faces different security dilemma 
(military and political institution, economic resources, idea of state). While 
political and economic globalization reduces the importance of military 
power in post-modern world (as the result of economic and political 
                                                                                                                                                     
Abkhazia and South Ossetia with passports it has paid local pensions, and has contributed 
significantly to thein state budgets. In the case of Transnistria, Russia is the source of 
(semi)-private investments, i tis a major market for exports, and it provides hans and credit, 
helps with pensions and has ensured the continued flow of subsidized gas, even in the face 
of nonpayment. A final example is the case of Northern Cyprus, which remains completely 
dependent on Turkey for its economic viability: the Turkish lira is used in the entity, the 
head of the central bank is a Turkish citizen and Turkey provides financial support in the 
form of aid, hans and subsidies (CASPERSEN 2012: 56).“ 
11 „Pal Kolsto argues that virtually all unrecognized states have a large shadow economy, 
often with intimate links to top state leaders (CASPERSEN 2012: 22).“ 
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cooperation), unrecognized states are located in the modern or pre-modern 
world, where national boundaries, anarchic international environment or 
traditional security dilemma still matter. It was accurately observed by 
Bottici: „The landscape of contemporary global politics is indeed extremely 
varied. As well as regions characterised by complex interdependence, there 
are others where global processes are weaker and produce quite different 
results.” (Bottici 2002: 15). 
 
Conclusion: the Impact of Recognition on Unrecognized States´ 
performance 
The aim of the text was to analyse the impact of non-recognition on 
economic potential and restrains of unrecognized states in the era of 
globalization. In the beginning it was necessary to challenge a mythology of 
de facto statehood which is based on an assumption that these entities are 
opposites to failed states. Although both types of entities are not unrelated, 
unrecognized states fail to create effective state-institutions, effectively 
control the whole territory to which they lay claim, or perform economically 
well (however it does not mean they are not able to resist parent state 
attempts to restore territorial integrity). They find themselves trapped in the 
world of chaos and insecurity (however collapse of some parent state enables 
unrecognized states to survive), outlined by the New Middle Ages Theory, 
where they cannot, with the exception of Taiwan or Rhodesia in past 
decades, rely on the system of negative sovereignty. I also argued that 
geopolitical position of particular unrecognized state plays a decisive role in 
its prospects and limits of economic growth. Restrains posed on these entities 
are of external character, and are results of their illegitimate origin (unilateral 
secession without the consent of the central government). Economic 
potential and restrains are defined by external factor: relation between the 
unrecognized state and its parent state and position within the international 
community. Position of unrecognized states ranges from completely pariah 
status (facing blockades without access to international markets) to 
recognition. Outcast countries are forced to follow alternative strategies, rely 
on patron state, shadow economies or diaspora community. This results in 
expansion of shadow economy in their effort to secure vital resources and 
existence (but this can undermine internal cohesion). Therefore unrecognized 
states are not bolstered by globalization because they are located in the 
global gap not in globalizing core, except of Taiwan again, which agreed to 
privatize its diplomatic relations in exchange for extensive engagement with 
the international community and parent state respectively. Taiwan challenges 
conventional wisdom that all unrecognized states consider independence 
more important than economy. 
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But in most cases „(t)he security imperative is seen as far more 
important than the economic imperative by the separatist authorities and their 
populations.” (Lynch 2004: 64). To reach political goal (independence) and 
economic goal (prosperity) is extremely difficulty for unrecognized states as 
they are mutually exclusive. “The cost of non-recognition for unrecognized 
states therefore depends on their ability to muster international goodwill and 
on the position of their parent state.” (Caspersen 2012: 45). Unrecognized 
states are located in modern or pre-modern world of positive sovereignty, 
where national boundaries, anarchic international environment or traditional 
security dilemma still matter. The possible outcome of the situation ranges 
from: 1) Reintegration through military means12 (e. g Biafra, South Kasai, 
Republika Srpska Krajina, South Ossetia), 2) autonomy arrangement 
(Bougainville, Gagauzia), 3) Power-sharing13, 4) The continuation of the 
status quo (Taiwan) (Caspersen 2012: 125-126) and 5) Independence 
(Eritrea, Kosovo in future). As stated above (best example might be 25 years 
long existence of Tamil Eelam which has been eliminated in 2009) even the 
existence of the unrecognized state exceeding two decade does not ensure its 
long-term survival.  
Unrecognized states are thus stuck in dilemma whether to try to 
pursue political (independence) as well as economic goals (prosperity) which 
seem to be mutually exclusive. So long as political elites of the unrecognized 
and parent state think in terms of zero sum game, the unrecognized state will 
face security dilemma. Also their economic performance is encumbered by 
the lack of their international legitimacy and geographical position within the 
global gap or post-modern world which limits their opportunity to interact at 
international level. Nine out of nine existing unrecognized states stretching 
from Europe over Africa to Asia failed to reach economic prosperity and 
muster international goodwill. It is even a case of the unrecognized states 
which reached relatively significant international recognition (Kosovo, 
SADR, Palestine). However their inability to engage with parent state 
strongly restrains their weak economies. As argued above contemporary 
unrecognized states (except of Taiwan) are located outside the core (or 
bordering gap) in the regions which are actually excluded from the process 
of globalization (sub-Saharan Africa, Caucasus, South-East Asia) (Waltz 
1999). The post-modern world left them aside in the unfavourable system 
defined by anarchic relations, positive sovereignty, traditional security 
dilemma, illegitimate status and unstable borders. First of all they 
desperately need to justify (externally) and defend (internally) their very 
                                                          
12 “The most likely outcome for unrecognized states, but it is anything but peaceful and 
often has very little to do with humanitarian values (CASPERSEN 2012: 123).” 
13 “This provides the unrecognized state with guarantees against being outvoted in the 
reintagrated parent state (CASPERSEN 2012: 126).” 
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existence in zero sum international game. I come to conclusion that potential 
and restrains of economic growth of particular unrecognized state is 
predominantly determined by its geographical position and systemic forces 
(political, military, economic power, international norms) which shape 
international environment in their region.  
Possible solution (in terms of economics) is a privatization of diplomatic 
relations which would make it possible to engage with parent states. This 
approach would require moderate approach of political elites on both sides. 
The only present days unrecognized states which may hope to reach 
internationally recognized independence is Kosovo, Palestine and even 
Western Sahara which meet conditions (large scale breach of religion 
tolerance, minority rights, human rights) under which the international 
community deems the rules of sovereignty invalid and subject to outside 
intervention (recognition). The other unrecognized states face the 
unfavourable political as well as geographical situation in which the 
international community prefers international stability. 
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